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Let an argument be modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its 
conclusion is true. Propositions begins with the assumption that some arguments are 
modally valid. Chapter 1—“Propositions and Modal Validity”—argues that the premises 
and conclusions of modally valid arguments exist necessarily, have their truth conditions 
essentially, and are the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity. Again, some arguments 
are modally valid. So there are the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments. 
So there are necessarily existing fundamental bearers of truth and falsity that have their 
truth conditions essentially. I shall call these entities ‘propositions’. So there are 
propositions.  
Chapter 1 argues that the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments 
are propositions (not sentences). Chapter 2—“Logical Validity and Modal Validity”—
argues that the premises and conclusions of logically valid arguments are sentences (not 
propositions). Chapter 2 also argues that modally valid arguments cannot be supplanted 
by logically valid arguments, thus buttressing Chapter 1’s argument for the existence of 
propositions. In fact, Chapter 2 defends the claim that an argument is logically valid only 
if the sentences that are its premises and conclusion express propositions that are 
themselves the premises and conclusion of a modally valid argument. And Chapter 2 
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delivers both a way to block a major objection to supervaluationism and also a solution to 
Kripke’s “puzzle of belief.” 
Chapter 3—“Propositions Are Not Sets of Possible Worlds”—opposes the 
arguments in support of the thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds. Moreover, 
this chapter defends a number of objections to that thesis. If propositions really are sets of 
possible worlds, then possible worlds really do exist. And if possible worlds really do 
exist, then they have a nature. This chapter’s most sustained objection to the thesis that 
propositions are sets of possible worlds maintains that that thesis cannot be combined, 
without incurring new and serious problems, with any standard account of the nature of 
possible worlds. In fact, this chapter argues that the best account of the nature of possible 
worlds rules out the thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds. 
The thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds is one of the two leading 
accounts of the nature of propositions. The other leading account endorses structured 
propositions. The central line of argument in Chapter 4—“Against Structured 
Propositions”—turns on the idea of a proposition’s representing things as being a certain 
way. (For example, the proposition that dogs bark represents dogs as barking, and for this 
reason is true if and only if dogs bark.) Chapter 4 motivates the claim that if there are 
structured propositions, then there is an explanation of how each proposition manages to 
represent things as being a certain way. This chapter then argues that if there are 
structured propositions, that explanation must be in terms of a proposition’s constituents 
and structure. But this chapter also argues that a structured proposition’s constituents and 
structure would not explain how that proposition manages to represent things as being a 
certain way. So this chapter concludes that there are no structured propositions.  
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Let a singular proposition be a proposition that is “directly about” an entity. 
Chapter 5—“Singular Propositions”—argues that while there are singular propositions, a 
singular proposition does not have the entity that it is directly about as a constituent. 
Chapter 5 thereby objects to the most widely defended versions of structured 
propositions, versions that claim that a singular proposition does have the relevant entity 
as a constituent. By arguing that we ought to reject the most widely defended versions of 
structured propositions, this chapter supports Chapter 4’s conclusion that we ought to 
reject structured propositions. Along the way, this chapter argues that there are singular 
propositions about entities that no longer exist, and indeed about entities that never have 
existed and never will exist. 
Chapters 3 through 5 consider the leading accounts of the nature of propositions, 
and therefore consider the principal rivals to any other account, including the account I 
defend. But I do not pretend to consider, much less refute, every possible rival to my own 
account. Nor need I. For—as far as supporting my own account of the nature of 
propositions goes—the point of Chapters 3 through 5 is not to refute all rivals in order to 
leave a void that only my account can then rush in to fill. Rather, the point of those 
chapters—at least as far as supporting my own account goes—is to defend claims about 
what a satisfactory account of the nature of propositions should, and should not, say. Of 
particular importance in this regard are objections raised in those chapters to alleged 
explanations of how a set of possible worlds or a structured proposition would manage to 
represent things as being a certain way. 
Chapter 6—“The Nature of Propositions”—presents and defends my account of 
the nature of propositions. My account says that each proposition is a necessary existent 
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that essentially represents things as being a certain way. That is it. This simple account is 
supported by arguments earlier in this book for the conclusion that propositions really do 
exist necessarily and really do essentially represent things as being a certain way. And 
this account is supported by its explaining why propositions have the further features and 
play the roles that—so I argue in various places throughout the book—propositions really 
do have and really do play. As we shall see, one of the implications of my account of the 
nature of propositions is that there is no explanation of how a proposition manages to 
represent things as being a certain way. Much of Chapter 6 focuses on this implication. I 
find this implication plausible partly because of arguments in Chapters 3 and 4 for the 
claim that our cognitive activity cannot play a role in explaining how a proposition 
manages to represent things as being a certain way. And I find this implication plausible 
partly because of arguments in those same chapters for the claim that how a proposition 
represents things as being would not—not even if that proposition had constituents—be 
explained by its constituents and structure. 
